People have likes and dislikes; Therefore, the people can be governed. The leader must examine likes and dislikes. Likes and dislikes are the basis of rewards and punishments. The disposition of the people is to love ranks and references and not to love punishments and punishments. The ruler uses both to guide the will of the people and determine what they want. (Shang jun shu 9:65; Lord Shang 9.3) Each of the competing “schools of thought” sought ways to improve the functioning of the state, achieve socio-political stability and establish peace under heaven; But among a multitude of answers, those given by legalists seem to be the most practical. This is no coincidence: after all, some of the most important legalistic thinkers, especially Shang Yang, were the leading reformers of their time. Legalistic thinkers were at the forefront of administrative and socio-political innovation; they were more willing to abandon past norms and paradigms; And they were more pragmatic and results-oriented than most of their ideological rivals. On the other hand, their hostility to traditional culture and moralistic discourse, as well as their highly critical attitude towards other members of the educated elite and their pronounced anti-ministerial approach, have earned them considerable hostility. In the long run, Sima Tan`s observation seems correct: the legalists` recipes were very effective in the short term, but much less attractive in the long term.
In imperial times, the position of legalism was somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, their ideas have remained very influential, particularly in the field of administrative practice, but also with regard to the policy of enrichment and empowerment of the State, as well as in certain legal practices. On some occasions, some of the leading imperial reformers – from Zhuge Liang 諸葛亮 (181-234) to Su Chuo 蘇綽 (498-546), from Wang Anshi 王安石 (1021-1086) to Zhang Juzheng 張居正 (1525-1582) – were able to openly confess their guilt to the legalistic methods of reviving the government apparatus and restoring the economic and military capabilities of the state. On the other hand, most political reformers and activists remained underground legalists at best. For the vast majority of scholars, Shang Yang, Han Fei and others were negative examples; As a result, most of the texts associated with the legalistic school ceased to circulate, and very few merited comment. Open support for Shang Yang, for example, would be virtually impossible for a respected man of letters. Guided by legalistic thinking, the first Qin emperor weakened the power of the feudal lords, divided the unified empire into thirty-six administrative provinces, and standardized weights and measures and the writing system. The Qin soldiers, reflecting the legalistic passion for order and structure, were only mobilized when the two tiger-shaped counting halves (one by the leader and the other by the commanding general) were brought together.
All documents of the empire had to include a record of the year in which they were written, the scribe who copied them, and the exact delivery time. The first Qin emperor ensured that no individual in the state was above the law by imposing severe penalties for all cases of dissent. Double taxation was imposed on households with more than one son, forcing clans and large family groups to split into smaller households. This proposal amounts to a “nationalization” of intellectual activity. Han Fei does not fundamentally deny that some of the rival doctrines could benefit the state; It only denies its defenders the right to develop and elaborate their views independently of the state. Han Fei has no illusions about his rivals: intellectuals can only pursue their ideas to the extent that they are part of the state-imposed system of power, otherwise their ideas will be “cut off”. Elsewhere, he concludes: Legalists shared the belief of most other political theorists of the Warring States period: stability and orderly rule either in the individual state or “all that is under heaven” can only be achieved under an all-powerful monarch. They added new dimensions to this global monarchist discourse. For example, in Shang Yang`s state-building model, the establishment of the ruler – unlike Mozi (see the section on political theory in the entry on mohism) – is not presented as a starting point, but as the culmination of socio-political evolution, as the final and particularly important step towards stability. The ruler is the only person who represents the common interests of the community (gong 公, “community”, is actually a word identical to “the Lord”; cf.
Goldin 2013:3-4). As such, his power is not understood as a means of personal pleasure, but as the common interest of his subjects. Shen Dao explains: These sayings and many others like explain Shang Yang`s image as a “slayer of the people.” No other thinker was as explicit as he was when he pointed out the persistent contradiction between society (“the people”) and the state. The intrinsic selfishness of the people constantly endangers the social order; And in order to ensure this order, the ruler must resolutely restrict his subjects by law (fa 法 in this context refers mainly to criminal laws). The state should strictly control its subjects: the system of compulsory registration of the population and the creation of mutual responsibility groups within the population will ensure that every crime is reported and that the criminal – especially those fleeing the battlefield – knows that “there is no place to escape the ranks of the army, and migrants cannot find refuge.” (Shang jun shu 18:108; Shang jun shu 18.3). In order to impress the people, the text also advocates imposing severe penalties even for minor offenses, because only then will the people be sufficiently afraid to behave properly. Finally, harsh punishments eliminated the need for punishment: it was not until the turn of the century that legalism was rediscovered and partially rehabilitated by new generations of intellectuals.