Being misled by linguistic formulations is not a trap unique to the Canadian legal landscape. The United States has its “hard view” test for determining whether an administrative decision was arbitrary or capricious. Does that mean that review tribunals literally have to look at the record, read it two or three times, or perhaps with a magnifying glass? But shouldn`t they always be looking closely? [33] Similar questions could be asked in the English standard of “timid tests”: shouldn`t a judge`s trial always be frightening? Should the “anxiety test” be compared to a “relaxed test”, which can be performed under the influence of barbiturates? In both cases, the answer is no. In fact, the labels “hard look” and “scrutiny” are dangerously misleading. Arbitrary and capricious review is indeed similar to the grounds for abuse of power – perhaps indistinguishable – of common law; [34] and careful scrutiny imposes additional procedural obligations on decision-makers in sensitive cases. [35] In no case is the language of harshness or fear the subject of analytical work. Music engraving is one of the most tedious, due to the care, precision and intelligence it requires. But he shares with Foster Wallace a gift for accuracy, erudition, and moral concern. His words are well chosen; They blend with cultivated precision and polished precision. This passage not only reveals the standard error of those who search in vain for terminological accuracy – what is the difference between “false” and “desperate or fundamentally false”? – but it also evokes a mythical decision-maker haunted by madness, as if the role of the judge was to present himself as a crazy civil servant called upon to make an administrative decision. But judicial review does not require such leaps of imagination.
It simply requires judges to consider whether a decision should be upheld or made and to apply the appropriate criteria to answer that question. Justice LeBel first stated that the judiciary must ensure “predictable, achievable and consistent jurisprudence” for lawyers, litigants and lower courts,[14] an obligation they have not fulfilled because the current law “does not currently provide sufficiently clear parameters.” [15] The limits of terminological precision could be most clearly observed in judicial attempts to distinguish more simply adequacy from patently unreasonableness. As LeBel J. explained, both standards had an underlying analytical basis – that sometimes, perhaps often, there will be more than one reasonable interpretation possible of a statutory provision, in which case a reviewing court would have to bow to the wisdom of the front-line decision-maker: “Given that both the manifest inadequacy and adequacy of the simplifier are rooted in this guiding principle, It was difficult to formulate such different standards analytically and not just semantically. [16] Language can be useful in reminding judges of the limits of the judicial role. As any student of administrative law quickly understands, it is not for a reviewing court to substitute its judgment on the merits of the decision made if a power has been delegated by law to an administrative body. Administrative lawyers make a fundamental distinction between judicial review – which is part of the inherent jurisdiction of higher courts but is limited to an assessment of legality – and remedies – which can only be created by law and which can allow an appellate body to intervene in the case. [1] Where judicial review requires a review of the merits of an administrative decision, such as in situations where the rationality of the decision is challenged, judges must be careful to respect the autonomy of the decision-maker chosen by Parliament. The clinical aspects of epilepsy are particularly difficult to study in detail. Indeed, the courageous efforts to distinguish the indistinguishable resembled gymnastics from legal language as the judges collapsed in their attempts to achieve a perfect verbal distillation of the two norms respectful of irrationality. Cory J.A.`s appeal to the adjective “unambiguously” added little more than “rhetorical effect.” [17] LeBel J.