The prohibition in 18 U.S.C. § 1001 requires that the misrepresentation, concealment, or concealment be “knowingly and intentionally,” meaning that “the testimony must have been given with intent to deceive, an intent to induce or mislead belief in falsehood, but Section 1001 does not require intent to deceive — that is, the intent to hide something from someone by deceiving them.” United States v. Lichenstein, 610 F.2d 1272, 1276-77 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 907 (1980). The government can prove that a false statement was made “knowingly and intentionally” by proving that the defendants acted intentionally and knowing that the statement was false. See United States v. Hopkins, 916 F.2d 207, 214 (5th Cir. 1990). The jury could conclude from a plan of elaborate lies and half-truths that the defendants intentionally provided the government with information they knew to be false. Id., pp.
214-15. When the term is knowingly used in an indictment, it means that the accused knew what he was going to do and, subject to that knowledge, was involved in the act of which he was charged. As used in the legislation, the term “knowingly” simply requires that the accused have acted with the knowledge of falsehood. See United States v. Lange, 528 F.2d 1280, 1287-89 (5th cir. 1976). As in other situations, committing an act “knowingly” means doing so knowingly or knowingly or knowingly, and not because of a mistake, accident or any other innocent reason. See Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions, § 1.35 (1990). Knowledge of the penal code, which regulates conduct, is not required. SCIEMEMENT, pleadings. The word “knowingly” or “knowingly” gives rise to a positive statement in an indictment or a statement that the defendant knew the facts presented later; If the notification or knowledge is mentioned unnecessarily, the application may be rejected as surplus. Empty com.
dig. Indictment, G 6; 2 Stra. 904; 2 East, 452; 1 puppy. Pl. *367; Scientific vacuum. The misrepresentation does not need to be made fraudulently if the intent is to mislead or promote belief in one`s lie. Reckless disregard for whether a statement is true or a conscious attempt not to learn the truth can be interpreted as “conscious” action. United States v. Evans, 559 F.2d 244, 246 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978). According to the provisions of the Model Penal Code, a person is deemed to have knowingly acted in relation to an essential element of a criminal offence if: if that element is related to the nature of his conduct or the circumstances associated with it, he knows that the conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; If the item refers to a result of the person`s behavior, they are aware of the fact that it is essentially certain that the behavior will trigger such an outcome. Conscious; intentionally; subject to a full understanding of the facts or circumstances. With knowledge; conscious; intelligent. The use of this word in an indictment is tantamount to asserting that the accused knew what he was going to do and that he committed the accused`s act knowingly. U. S. v. Claypool (D.
C.) 14 Fed. 128. The term “intentional” means nothing more than the fact that the prohibited act was committed intentionally and knowingly, and does not require proof of malicious intent. McClanahan v. United States, 230 F.2d 919, 924 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 824 (1956); McBride v. United States, 225 F.2d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
934 (1956). An act is committed “intentionally” when it is done voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent to do something that the law prohibits. It is not necessary for the government to show bad intent on the part of a defendant to prove that the act was committed “deliberately.” See generally United States v. Gregg, 612 F.2d 43, 50-51 (2d cir. 1979); American Surety Company v. Sullivan, 7 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1925)(Hand, J.); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971) (including 15 U.S.C. Section 32(a)). See also 1 E. Devitt, C. Blackmar, M. Wolff & K. O`Malley, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, § 17.05 (1992). A defendant is not exempt from the consequences of a material misrepresentation through ignorance if the means to establish veracity are available. In appropriate circumstances, the government can prove that the defendant knew of the lie by proving that the defendant knew the statement was false or acted with a deliberate purpose to avoid learning the truth. See United States v.
West, 666 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1981); Lange, 528 F.2d to 1288; United States v. Clearfield, 358 F. Supp. 564, 574 (A.D. Pa. 1973). Proving that the accused acted with reckless contempt or reckless indifference may therefore satisfy the knowledge requirement if the accused makes a material false statement and deliberately avoids learning the facts or intends to deceive the government. See United States v. Schaffer, 600 F.2d 1120, 1122 (5th Cir.
1979). Supported by Black`s Law Dictionary, Free 2nd ed., and The Law Dictionary.