A decision for the plaintiff would inevitably have caused a significant degree of chaos, a consequence that would have been avoided if it had been possible without the abolition of the judicial obligation to enforce the Constitution. With regard to the right to vote, there are major gaps in the Constitution. However, the right to vote is inherent in the republican form of government provided for in Article IV, Section 4, of the Constitution. The House of Representatives — and now the Senate — is elected by the people. The time, manner and place of elections of senators and deputies are left to the States (Article I, Section 4, Clause 1; Amendment XVII) is submitted to the regulatory authority of Congress. A “republican form of government” is guaranteed to every state by Article IV, Section 4, and everyone is also promised protection against invasion. [Footnote 2/2] Ibid. “Annul any law, whether state or U.S., because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, unless it is called upon to assess the legal rights of litigants in real controversies.” “Considering that there are no legal state governments. now [sic] exists in the rebel states of. Georgia [and] Mississippi. , and that it is necessary that peace and good order be applied in these states until loyal and republican state governments can be legally established.
Baker v. Carr, (1962), a U.S. Supreme Court case that forced the Tennessee legislature to redivide on a population basis. Traditionally, particularly in the south, the population of rural areas has been over-represented in legislation compared to that of urban and suburban areas. Prior to the Baker case, the Supreme Court had refused to intervene in pay-as-you-go cases; In 1946, in Colegrove v. Green, the court said the division was a “political thicket” that the judiciary should not penetrate. In Baker, however, the court ruled that every vote should have the same weight, regardless of where the voter lived. In doing so, the Tennessee Legislature had violated the constitutionally guaranteed right to equal protection (see above). Chief Justice Earl Warren called this the most important case decided after his appointment as a judge in 1953. “The court ruled on the case on the grounds that the Redistribution Act of 1929, 46 Stat. 21, the requirements of the 1911 Act, 37 Stat. 13, did not continue and refused to decide whether the law contained fairness.
An unbroken line of our precedents confirms the jurisdiction of the federal courts for the subject matter of federal constitutional claims of this kind. The first cases concerned the redistribution of states for the purpose of electing representatives to the Federal Congress. When the Ohio Supreme Court upheld Ohio`s legislation against an attack for violation of Article I,§ 4 of the Federal Constitution, we reaffirmed the merits and expressly refused to refuse for incompetence. the subject of the controversy and the federal characteristics it contains. Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 241 U.S. 570. When the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a lawsuit to prevent the Minnesota Secretary of State from acting under Minnesota`s redistricting legislation, we reviewed the constitutional merits of the legislation and struck down the state Supreme Court. Smiley v.
Holm, 285 U.S. 355 And see the related cases of the New York Court of Appeals and the Missouri Supreme Court, Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375; Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 When a three-judge district court that had jurisdiction under the predecessor of 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) permanently barred Officials of the State of Mississippi from conducting an election of representatives under a Mississippi Redistribution Act, we considered the federal issues on the merits and struck down the District Court. Wood vs. Broom, 287 U. P.
1, inversion 1 F. Supp. 134. A similar executive order issued by a district court exercising jurisdiction under the same act with respect to a Kentucky redistribution law stated: “When a state exercises power entirely in the area of the state`s interest, it is isolated from federal judicial review. But such isolation will not be adopted if state power is used as an instrument to circumvent a federally protected right. On the other hand, the implication of the warranty clause in a case involving congressional action does not always preclude legal action. It was noted that the clause does not give Congress the power to impose restrictions on the admission of a state that would undermine the constitutional mandate that states must be equal. Coyle vs. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 And in Texas v.
White, 7 wall. 700, although Congress determined that the state government was not Republican, the state`s power to bring an initial action in that court was upheld. This case, so often cited for the general thesis that the status of an Indian tribe is a matter for political departments, is indeed a remarkable example of the limited and precise impact of a political issue. The Cherokee filed an initial lawsuit with this court to enforce Georgia`s assertion of jurisdiction over Cherokee territory and the abolition of the Cherokee government and laws. Undoubtedly, the case lay in the maelstrom of the most inflamed political entanglements. See 1 Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History (Rev. ed.), 729-779. But despite a broader formulation in separate opinions, the Court merely found that it did not initially have jurisdiction to hear the action, since the Cherokees could in no way be regarded as a State of that Union or a “foreign State”. Marshall C.J. treated the issue as a matter of de novo interpretation of the words of the Constitution. The Chief Justice stated that “our government`s actions clearly recognize the Cherokee Nation as a state, and the courts are bound by these acts,” but he referred here to their existence “as a state, as a distinct political society, separate from others.” From there, he went to “A much more difficult question.
Are the Cherokees a foreign state within the meaning of the Constitution? Id. at 30 U. P. 16. Although the court referred to “politics” in deciding whether the tribe was an entity, a separate regime, it concluded that the question of whether the tribe had such status that it initially had the right to bring an action was a question that could be resolved by the courts: the criteria could be found in the relevant sentences of the Constitution and in the general understanding of the time. On this issue, the Court has not been hampered by unusual evidence management problems or possible interference with a congressional agenda. Moreover, Marshall C.J.`s saying that “it is too expensive to exercise political power to fall within the proper jurisdiction of the Division of Justice,” id. 30 U.S. 20, did not address the question of the status of the Cherokees to be prosecuted, but the extent of the claim claimed and the inadequacy of the relief sought. Compare 73 U. S. Stanton, 6 Wall.
50, 73 United States 77 The Chief Justice clarified that if the question of Cherokee rights arose in a normal legal context, “a proper case with the appropriate parties” would be justiciable. Thus, if the same dispute gave rise to a duly pending case in which the claimed right to protection under treaties and federal laws against the competing constitutional right existed, and the appeal sought was the quashing of a conviction under that land law, the court quashed the conviction. Worcester vs. Georgia, 6 fart. 515. There, the fact that the tribe was a separate political regime served as a date that contributed to the result, and despite the consequences of a lively controversy between the Federation and the Länder and the resistance of the other branches of the national government, the judiciary acted to overthrow the Supreme Court of the State. An example of similar isolation of a political issue in the decision of a case is Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, see below. Just as, according to settled case-law, the Court has held that a challenge to an action of the State based on the guarantee clause does not raise a justiciable question, it has held, for the same reasons, that the challenge to the measures taken by the Congress on the ground that they are incompatible with that clause does not raise a justiciable question.
In Georgia against Stanton, 6 wall.